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Abstract 
 
Strong geomagnetic disturbances resulting from solar activity can have a major impact on ground-based
infrastructures, such as power grids, pipelines and railway systems. The high voltage transmission network is
particularly affected as currents induced by geomagnetic storms, so-called GICs, can severely damage network
equipment possibly leading to system collapse. Therefore, increasing attention has been devoted to
understanding the vulnerability of power grids to space weather conditions. In this study, we aim at analysing the
vulnerability of power grids to extreme space weather. By means of complex network theory, we propose an
analysis approach to understand how geomagnetically induced currents are driven through the power network
based on its structural and physical characteristics. As a test network we used the Finnish power grid for which a
study using network centrality measures was carried out to understand which components are the most critical for
the system when exposed to an electric field of 1V/km. This information is helpful as the identification and ranking
of critical components can help to identify where and how mitigation measures should be implemented to
increase the system’s resilience to space weather impact. We have also subjected the grid to varying angles of the
electric field. In addition, we have carried out a scoping study adding load flow to the GICs induced in the system.
The preliminary results suggest that the benchmark system can resist GICs induced from high intensity electric
fields. Moreover, the simplified network seems more prone to collapse if the electric field is oriented northward.
Work is underway to further validate and expand our approach with the aim to eventually carry out a risk
assessment of space weather impact on the power grid at EU level. 
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Abstract 
Strong geomagnetic disturbances resulting from solar activity can have a major impact on ground-
based infrastructures, such as power grids, pipelines and railway systems. The high voltage 
transmission network is particularly affected as currents induced by geomagnetic storms, so-called 
GICs, can severely damage network equipment possibly leading to system collapse. The first accident 
of this kind occurred in Canada in 1989 where it took only 90 seconds for the entire Hydro-Quebec 
power grid to collapse during a geomagnetic storm. Since then, increasing attention has been 
devoted to understanding the vulnerability of power grids to space weather conditions. 
In this study, we aim at analysing the vulnerability of power grids to extreme space weather. By 
means of complex network theory, we propose an analysis approach to understand how 
geomagnetically induced currents are driven through the power network based on its structural and 
physical characteristics. As a test network we used the Finnish power grid for which a study using 
network centrality measures was carried out to understand which components are the most critical 
for the system when exposed to an electric field of 1V/km. This information is helpful as the 
identification and ranking of critical components can help to identify where and how mitigation 
measures should be implemented to increase the system’s resilience to space weather impact. We 
have also subjected the grid to varying angles of the electric field. In addition, we have carried out a 
scoping study adding load flow to the GICs induced in the system. The preliminary results suggest 
that the benchmark system can resist GICs induced from high intensity electric fields. Moreover, the 
simplified network seems more prone to collapse if the electric field is oriented northward. 
Work is underway to further validate and expand our approach with the aim to eventually carry out 
a risk assessment of space weather impact on the power grid at EU level.  
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1. Introduction 
Geomagnetic disturbances produced by solar activity, also called space weather, can affect ground-
based critical infrastructures, potentially causing damage to systems and resulting in failures and 
service disruptions. Among critical infrastructures, the long-distance, high-voltage power grids are 
particularly vulnerable to geomagnetic storms: effects may comprise both limited equipment failure 
and potential voltage instability resulting in uncontrolled cascading of the bulk power system 
(Krausmann et al, 2013; Schrijver and Mitchell, 2013). 
The collapse of the Hydro-Québec transmission network during a geomagnetic storm in 1989 was a 
warning sign for the vulnerability of power grids to space weather events. The consequences of the 
Hydro-Québec blackout on the industrial production in a number of sectors also highlight the 
increased likelihood of significant domino effects in case of a power outage (Boteler, 2001). 
Several studies have been dedicated to the assessment of the power grid’s vulnerability to extreme 
space weather and to the investigation of the potential consequences of prolonged blackouts on 
society (NRC, 2008; Kappenman, 2010; JASON 2011; NERC, 2012). These studies focus on a potential 
major space weather impact on the North American transmission network and its components, and 
especially on high-voltage transformers. An extreme event, such as the 1859 Carrington event, is 
believed to be able to cause disruptions in the power grid that subsequently cascade to other critical 
infrastructures with a worst-case long-term recovery time for society of 4-10 years (NRC, 2008).  
An extreme geomagnetic storm would encompass also a significant part of Europe (Pulkkinen et al, 
2012). Various analyses of the vulnerability of the European power grid have considered reliability 
failures and intentional attacks (Brancucci et al, 2012; Rosas-Casals, 2007; Bompard, 2009) but 
hardly any information exists on the vulnerability of the European power grid to space weather 
events. 
This study aims at identifying the vulnerability of the European power transmission grid with respect 
to extreme space weather by using complex network theory. We try to understand the spatial 
distribution and magnitude of GIC loading and the impact on grid operations potentially incurred. In 
a later step, this study will continue to estimate the impact of extreme space weather on society in 
Europe via the interdependencies of critical infrastructures with the power grid. 
Section 2 presents a general overview of the physical phenomenon of geomagnetic storms and their 
impact on ground based critical infrastructures. In Section 3 we propose the vulnerability framework 
which will guide our analysis, and first results including a discussion are presented in Section 4. 
Conclusions and future work are discussed in Section 5. 
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2. Space weather and GICs 
Space weather is a consequence of the interaction of the Sun, the Earth’s magnetic field and the 
atmosphere. High-energy particles and radiation ejected from the Sun, once they reach the Earth, 
can cause temporary fluctuations of the geomagnetic field: these variations are called geomagnetic 
disturbances (GMDs). Transient fluctuations of sufficient severity are termed geomagnetic storms 
(GMSs).  
Coronal mass ejections (CMEs), solar flares and radio bursts are the main phenomena connected 
with the formation of GMDs. CMEs are usually associated with large flares. If CMEs are Earth-
directed, they interact with Earth’s magnetosphere and cause geomagnetic storms that are observed 
on Earth one to six days after a flare or an eruption occurs on the Sun (FEN, 2013). GMSs, in turn, can 
create geomagnetically induced current (GICs) flows that can potentially affect the operation of 
power system equipment. Equipment impacted by previous storms include transformers, circuit 
breakers, generators and protective devices. 
Several factors determine the degree to which a GMS affects the power system and its equipment. 
These include (NERC, 2012): 
• Magnitude and orientation of the magnetic field 
• Geomagnetic latitude 
• Geology of the local area, including the electrical conductivity of the soil 
• Proximity to an ocean or large water bodies  
• Directional orientation, resistance and length of transmission lines 
• Design of the power system and its equipment 
GMSs can affect the components and the operation of power systems through a wide range of 
impacts. Effects with minor severity may be the tripping of electrical equipment or control 
malfunctions. Major GMSs may trigger voltage and reactive power fluctuations, local disruption of 
service, equipment failure and potential voltage instability that can potentially result in the 
uncontrolled cascading of the bulk power system. 
2.1 Geomagnetic Storms (GMSs) 
The sun continuously emits charged particles in all directions. This stream of mainly protons and 
electrons is called solar wind. CMEs are fast-moving bursts of plasma created by high-energy 
phenomena on the sun. They can reach the Earth in a matter of days, if oriented in the right 
direction, where the CME plasma then interacts with and perturbs the Earth’s magnetosphere, a 
region in space where the motion of charged particles is determined by the Earth’s magnetic field 
(Figure 1). Of significance for the formation of GMSs is the ionosphere, a part of the atmosphere 
where electric currents, or electrojets, periodically travel around the Earth (Püthe and Kuvshinov, 
2013).  
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of solar wind particles interacting with Earth’s magnetosphere. Size is not 
to scale (NASA, 2014). 
 
Particularly relevant are the auroral electrojets which are large horizontal currents that flow in the 
auroral ionosphere following generally circular paths around the geomagnetic poles at altitudes of 
about 100 kilometers in an eastward (EEJ) or westward direction (WEJ), as shown in Figure 2 (INGV, 
2014). Since the conductivity of the auroral ionosphere and its horizontal electric field are generally 
larger than that at lower latitudes, the auroral electrojet currents are particularly relevant for their 
strength and continuity.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Representation of the East (EEJ) and West (WEJ) auroral electrojet (INGV, 2014) 
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When the geomagnetic activity is low, the electrojet would mostly be limited to the auroral oval. 
However, during periods with high geomagnetic activity, the electrojet expands to higher and lower 
latitudes and becomes stronger. This can result in geomagnetic field fluctuations, or GMDs.  Severe 
transient fluctuations or GMSs are measured in nanoteslas (nT). The Earth’s magnetic field at the 
poles is about 70 000 nT. During a severe storm, the fluctuation can be so strong so as to deflect 
compass needles. 
A common scale used to indicate levels of geomagnetic activity are the K and Ak indices (SWPC, 
2014). The K-index ranges from 0 to 9 and is related to the maximum fluctuations of the horizontal 
magnetic field variation over a three-hour interval. The maximum positive and negative deviations of 
the data recorded every minute over a 3-hour period are added to determine the total maximum 
fluctuation. These fluctuations may occur at any time during the 3-hour interval. The Ak index ranges 
from 0 to 400 and is a 24-hour index derived from 8 daily K indices. Values of K from 0 to 4 (and of Ak 
from 0 to 20) represent quiet geomagnetic activity, values from 5 to 6 (and of Ak from 30 to 50) 
represent a minor storm and a severe storm results in a K ranging from 7 to 9 (and of Ak from 100 to 
400).  
The solar activity approximately follows an 11-year cycle. Since 1755, when recording of the solar 
activity began, 24 cycles have been recorded.  The current 24th cycle has begun in January 2009. The 
previous cycles 22 and 23 lasted from September 1986 to May 1996 and from May 1996 to 
December 2008 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 3. Sunspot cycles and the occurrence and intensity (using the Ap index) of geomagnetic storms 
(Kappenmann, 2010) 
 
As shown in Figure 3, it appears that the geomagnetic activity is also cyclical, although it has to be 
stressed that a severe storm can occur at any time during a cycle, and not only around the peaks of 
sunspot activity. It should also be noted that not every solar event produces a GMD on Earth, which 
makes forecasting storms based on solar observation only very difficult. New forecasting capability is 
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based on missions by NASA and European Space Agency, which provides data on the space 
environment (NERC, 2012). 
For electric utilities, however, it is more important to know the time derivative of the geomagnetic 
field over a few minutes because it is this value that is a key factor in calculating GICs (IEEE, 1993): 
for example, a rate of variation of 300 nT/min indicates a violent storm. Large values of K or Ak in 
general are not directly translatable into large GICs, since they depend on averages over a fixed 
period of time, and are thus only an indirect indicator of a GMD that can affect power systems. 
2.2 Historical overview – Major GMSs of the past  
The Carrington Event of 1859 
The largest recorded magnetic storm occurred between August 27 and September 7, 1859 and it is 
known as the ‘Carrington Event’, after the British amateur astronomer who was the first to associate 
the storm with an intense solar flare 17.1 hours earlier. There were eyewitness accounts of auroras 
even at equatorial latitudes (JASON, 2011). The world’s telegraph networks experienced severe 
disruptions, in some cases telegraph operators received electric shocks (NRC, 2008), and Victorian 
magnetometers were driven off the scale (BGS, 2014).  
The 1921 Solar Storm 
In May 1921, auroras were observed in Europe, across North America and far south at latitudes of 
30-35 degrees (Silverman, 2001). This storm was reported to have “blown out fuses and injured 
electrical apparatus”. Telegraph communications were disrupted in cities in the United States and 
some cables and telegraph lines to Alaska did not function during the storm (Solarstorms, 2014 and 
references of Newspapers herein).  
The 1989 Québec Blackout 
On 13 March 1989, a severe geomagnetic storm caused the entire Hydro-Québec transmission 
system to collapse (Boteler, 2001), resulting in a blackout that affected 6 million people. It took only 
90 second for the grid to break down and more than 9 hours to restore power.  
The blackout had ripple effects also on North American power system and utilities. One of the 
nuclear power plant transformers in Salem, New Jersey, suffered damage and had to be replaced.  
The 2003 Halloween Solar Storms 
The largest recent storms originate in 17 major solar flares that erupted on the sun between October 
19 and November 5, 2003. Extensive effects on technological systems and human activities were 
reported. The most affected were spaced-based infrastructures: sensors and electronic devices of 
satellites were damaged and airline routes and schedules were significantly affected due to 
communication degradation and concerns about increased radiation exposure (NERC, 2012).  
The electric power industry in North America experienced some effects, which include high levels of 
neutral current, capacitor trips, and some transformer heating.  
The impacts were more significant in Northern Europe where an estimated GIC flow of 330 Amperes 
in a transformer in Southern Sweden caused a 130 kV line to trip, resulting in a 40 minutes blackout 
(NERC, 2012). No transformer issues were reported to be associated with the currents induced by 
the geomagnetic storm in Sweden. 
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2.3 Simulation of extreme GMSs 
In order to simulate extreme GMS events, a number of factors that determine the geoelectric field 
need to be considered. The main factors are the effect of the ground conductivity structure and 
geomagnetic latitudes on the geomagnetic field amplitudes, as well as the temporal and spatial 
scales of the extreme geoelectric fields. 
2.3.1 Ground conductivity structure 
During geomagnetic storms, magnetic field variations produce an electric field that drives large 
electric currents through the ground and in conductor networks (Campbell, 1980; Boteler et al., 
1998). Large power systems extend across different geological structures and the effect of 
conductivity changes needs to be accounted for when dealing with geomagnetic fields and GICs 
calculations.  
Different techniques are available to develop ground conductivity models (Kappenman, 2010). On 
the one hand, descriptions of the local geology can be used to infer an average value of conductivity 
versus depth for the region of interest (Thomson et al, 2009; Pracser et al, 2012). Methods for 
modeling earth conductivity structures can be one- (1D), two- (2D) or three-dimensional (3D). Some 
models and methods are advantageous in terms of computation speed while others provide a better 
accuracy (Dong et al, 2013). Past experience has suggested that 1D Earth conductivity models are 
sufficient for the evaluation of the local electric field (Viljanen et al., 2012; Pracser et al, 2012; 
Kappenman, 2010). The general 1D model consists of a half-space, representing the ground, that is 
divided into N layers with the n-th layer having a resistivity ρn (or conductivity σn = 1/ ρn) and 
thickness z (Figure 4). 
Mono-dimensional models only contain the variation of conductivity with depth and ignore any 
lateral variations. Discontinuity of the conductivity structure due to ground variations, for example 
near oceans, can be accounted for by using adequate boundary conditions.  
On the other hand, actual measurements of geomagnetic and electric fields are available for certain 
regions of interest (Kappenman, 2010). Modern fluxgate magnetometers allow magnetic measures 
of the three-components of the magnetic field. In North America, The United States Geological 
Survey (USGS, www.usgs.gov) and the Geological Survey of Canada (GSC, www.nrcan.gc.ca/earth-
science) operates the magnetic observatories. In Europe, the British Geological Survey (BGS, 
www.bgs.ac.uk) is one of the most active. Magnetic data are also available from these institutes 
through the InterMagnet international consortium website (www.intermagnet.org). 
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Figure 4. Mono-dimensional N-layered Earth model. Data are taken from Pracser et al (2012). 
 
2.3.2 Temporal and spatial scale 
The digital geomagnetic data can also be used to evaluate the rate of change of the magnetic field 
dB/dt. Figure 5 reproduces the percentage occurrences of dB/dt > 300nT/minute, derived from 
North American magnetic observatories. Since the probability variation with the geomagnetic 
latitude is smooth, the results were extrapolated along lines of constant geomagnetic latitude. The 
color grading extends from red, where the probability is higher, to yellow in those areas where the 
probability diminishes. A low probability for large GMD events is expected in most of North America 
and Central Europe (Molinski et al., 2000). 
An alternative approach to the calculation of the electric fields is by means of a statistical analysis on 
the electric field values. Pulkkinen et al (2012) used 10-second samplings of geomagnetic data 
recorded from 1993 to 2006, thus covering a solar cycle period, to determine the electric field 
magnitude expected once in a 100 years. The two main results of this analysis are that the 
occurrence of large electric fields decreases with increasing amplitude (Fig. 6 left) and the peak 
electric fields shows a strong dependence on latitude (Fig. 6 right). 
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Figure 5. Map representing the probability of a significant geomagnetic storm, with a field change greater than 
300nT/min (Rodrigue, 2014). 
 
 
 
   
Figure 6. On the left, the statistical occurrence of the geoelectric field is represented: the different colors 
correspond to different IMAGE stations used in the computation. The thick black and grey lines represents the 
approximate extrapolation and the upper and lower boundaries, respectively. The maximum 100-year 
amplitude is estimated to be between 10-50V/Km. On the right, the geomagnetic latitude distribution of the 
maximum computed geoelectric field for the 2003 Halloween GMS is shown (Pulkkinen et al, 2012). 
2.4 Space weather effects on power systems 
The critical infrastructure that society has become most reliant on is the power grid. Power networks 
play a vital role in everyday life either as a standalone critical infrastructure providing electrical 
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power but also as a service provider to many other critical infrastructures that critically rely on the 
power grid. 
GICs are quasi-DC currents that can cause numerous problems when entering the power grid. 
Transformers are particularly susceptible to GIC impact as they are not designed to handle the DC 
current. In fact, almost all power grid equipment and operations problems due to space weather 
arise from disturbed transformer performance, which is driven into half-cycle saturation by the GIC. 
As a consequence, the normally nearly linear relationship between input and output voltages and 
currents is shifted into a non-linear region. A number of secondary effects follow, such as increased 
reactive power consumption and the injection of even and odd harmonics into the power system. 
These harmonics cause even less compensating reactive power to be available, which can eventually 
lead to grid collapse (Molinski, 2002). Boteler (2001) notes that the situation is worse for power grids 
with long transmission lines, e.g. in the range of hundreds of kilometers, because longer lines have 
higher voltage support requirements. 
The following sections briefly describe the main damage and failure modes associated with GIC 
loading in power grids. 
Transformer saturation 
Power transformers are used for stepping up voltage levels for electricity transport in transmission 
lines or reducing the voltage for electricity distribution to the customers. They use steel cores and 
are designed to be extremely efficient. As shown in Figure 7 (left), transformers usually operate in 
the linear range of their magnetic characteristic, which corresponds to an exciting current of only a 
few Amperes of AC. If GICs flow in the system, the operating point on the steel core saturation curve 
is shifted towards the nonlinear portion of the characteristic (Figure 7 right). Consequently, 
saturation occurs during one half of the cycle, causing a very high and asymmetrical exciting current 
(10-15% or more of the rated load current) to be drawn by the transformer (Ngnegueu et al, 2012).  
Different transformer types are impacted differently by half-cycle saturation (Kappenman, 2010). 
Single-phase transformers, in particular, are more at risk than three-phase transformers because the 
quasi DC flux induced by the GIC can flow directly in the core. Furthermore, shell-type transformers 
are at greater risk than core-type transformers while autotransformers are particularly susceptible 
(Kappenman, 2010).  
Reactive power losses 
Transformers saturated by GIC loading have a higher reactive power consumption, which increases 
linearly with GIC magnitude (Albertson, 1973; Walling and Kahn, 1991). Single-phase transformers 
consume the largest amount of reactive power. A 90° voltage shift caused by the excitation current 
during saturation creates a reactive power demand from the power system. As a consequence there 
may be drops in system voltage and the stability margins may decrease significantly because 
additional reactive power is being consumed. The situation is exacerbated if voltage support devices 
trip during GIC events (Molinski, 2002) because of the injection of harmonics into the system. 
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Figure 7. Relationship of exciting current and magnetic flux under normal operating conditions (left) and in the 
presence of GICs (right) (Molinski, 2002). 
 
Harmonics 
When a transformer is driven into half-cycle saturation, the exciting currents contain harmonics of 
various orders (fundamental, 2nd, 3rd, etc.), giving rise to complex current patterns. In case of very 
large GIC levels, the contribution of harmonics declines, especially at the higher orders, since the 
transformer is operating in a completely linear, although saturated, region of its magnetizing curve 
(Molinski, 2002). Power grids are generally designed to cope with odd harmonics (e.g. 3rd). However, 
they can be overwhelmed by even harmonics (e.g. negative sequence 2nd harmonic) because they 
are usually not expected during power operations (Molinski, 2002). False neutral overcurrent relay 
actuation may be the consequence. Moreover, harmonic currents can also cause additional series 
losses in e.g. circuit breakers and filter banks.  
Transformer overheating 
In case of transformer saturation most of the excess magnetic flux flows externally to the core into 
the transformer tank, where currents are created and localized tank wall heating with temperatures 
reaching 175°C can occur (Kappenman, 1996). If a transformer is repeatedly exposed to heating due 
to GIC loading, it can lead to cumulative insulation damage, accelerated ageing and eventually 
transformer failure (Koen and Gaunt, 2003). Unfortunately, in such cases it is usually not 
straightforward to relate cause and effect, so the real cause of transformer failure could be 
attributed to other reasons.  
 
Generator overheating 
Although no serious generator damage due to GMSs has been documented so far, there is at least 
theoretically some potential for damage (Molinski, 2002). Generators are usually shielded from 
direct GIC impact but they can still be affected by harmonics and voltage unbalance caused by 
transformer saturation. If harmonic currents enter the generator, excessive heating and mechanical 
vibrations can result. Moreover, the energy of the higher harmonic orders is concentrated near the 
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rotor surface which can also heat up and create a crack initiation site. As is the case for transformer 
heating, these phenomena may diminish the useful life of a generator, although the damage might 
not be immediately apparent and a potential failure at a later stage not necessarily attributed to GIC 
impact.  
Protection relay tripping 
In case of GIC flows, the harmonic content of the power system increases. With modern digital 
relays measuring the peak current value to monitor the status of the system, they are sensitive to 
tripping by harmonics. These false trips can then indirectly trigger a cascading failure of the power 
system. The relays’ set current can be adjusted to accommodate the higher harmonics during GID 
impact and reduce the risk of false trips. However, this comes at the cost of lower protection levels 
(FEN, 2013).  
Power systems increasingly depend on reactive power compensators and shunt capacitor banks for 
voltage control. Generally, shunt capacitors are grounded and have protection against unbalanced 
operation via neutral overcurrent relays. However, these capacitors banks are vulnerable to false 
trips during GMSs because of the capacitor’s low impedance at the associated harmonic frequencies. 
Several power grid operators have upgraded or even replaced their neutral overcurrent unbalance 
protection to reduce the likelihood of false trips (IEEE, 1993).  
Effects on communication systems for power grids 
Geomagnetic storms also affect long-haul telephone lines, including undersea connections, and 
internet cables. The measurement and communication infrastructure directly used for power 
systems operation and control is expected to be relatively unaffected by GMSs, as the high-
bandwidth lines in SCADA networks consist increasingly of optical fibers, which do not suffer the 
effects of electromagnetic disturbance (FEN, 2013). A potential system weakness lies in the use of 
Global Satellite Navigation System services (e.g. GPS) to obtain time stamps for, e.g. phasor 
measurements, as these space-based infrastructures would take the full brunt of the incoming solar 
storm and likely suffer a severe temporary service degradation. 
2.5 Effects on other earthed critical infrastructures 
2.5.1 Pipelines 
Although there is controversy on the true impact of space weather on pipelines, there are 
indications that buried pipelines may suffer damage from steel corrosion due to GICs (Gummow, 
2002; Pulkkinen et al, 2001; Pirjola et al, 2000). Corrosion is an electrochemical process occurring in 
pipelines at points where a current flows from the pipe to the soil. For example, a continuous DC 
current of 1 A flowing in a conductor for one year may cause a loss of about 10 kg of steel (Pirjola, 
2012). To prevent or minimize corrosion, cathodic protection (CP) systems are implemented for 
pipelines. They keep the pipeline at a negative voltage of usually slightly below 1 V with respect to 
the soil. Pipe-to-soil voltages associated with GICs may exceed the CP voltage, which can render 
protection systems ineffective. Pipelines are covered with highly resistive coating which is preferred 
from a protection point of view.  However, a high resistance also increases pipe-to-soil voltages 
implying larger harmful currents where defects are present in the coating (Pirjola, 2012). 
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Modeling of GICs in pipelines has evolved over the last thirty years. The first studies of Lehtinen and 
Pirjola (1985) presented theoretical calculations of GICs for the Finnish natural gas pipeline, with the 
assumption that the insulating coating of the pipeline was earthed at the cathodic protection 
stations. Viljanen (1989) presented a GIC study about the Finnish natural gas pipeline based on the 
simplified assumption that the pipeline is an infinitely long multi-layered cylindrical structure in a 
homogeneous medium.  
An improvement in theoretical modelling is given by Boteler (1997) by incorporating the distributed-
source transmission line theory (DSTL) into pipeline-GIC calculations. An extension is provided by 
Pulkkinen et al. (2001) which considers the branches of a pipeline network. In the DSTL theory, the 
pipeline is considered a transmission line containing a series impedance Z (or resistance due to the 
DC treatment) determined by the properties of the pipeline steel, and a parallel admittance Y 
associated with the resistivity of the coating (Boteler, 1997). The geoelectric field affecting the 
pipeline forms the distributed source. An important parameter, called the adjustment distance, is 
the inverse of the propagation constant γ defined by 
                                                                            ZY=γ                                                                              (2.1) 
Typical values of the adjustment distance of a real pipeline are tens of kilometers, with the exact 
values depending on the radius of the pipeline at a specific section. Usually, the adjustment distance 
ranges from about 20 km to about 60 km. 
Pipelines are considered electrically long if their length significantly exceeds the adjustment 
distance; for electrically short pipelines the opposite is true. From a GIC point of view, electrically 
long pipelines exhibit a different behaviour than electrically short ones. For a long pipeline, the 
voltage decays exponentially at a distance comparable to the adjustment distance, when moving 
from either end of the pipeline towards the center where it is practically zero. Therefore, GIC flows 
between the pipe and the soil near the ends of a long pipeline, but the central parts are not critical 
regarding corrosion problems due to GIC Pirjola, 2012) On the other hand, for a short pipeline, the 
voltage changes linearly along the pipeline, and the current along the pipe is small when the ends 
are insulated from the Earth. Studies also show that the largest potential variations occur at 
discontinuities, such as at bends, insulating flanges and at the end of the pipeline. 
 
2.5.2 Railways 
Only very few studies exist on the potential impact of GICs on railway networks up till now: they 
mainly focus on anomalies in the operation of the signaling system. In 1982, a strong GMS affected 
the Swedish railway system. Between the nights of 13 and 14 July, apparently without reason, the 
traffic lights on the line turned red in a railway section of about 45 km length in South Sweden. The 
intense geoelectric field affected the relays connected to the rails inducing them to react as if a train 
occupied the rails (Wik et al, 2009).  
From 2000 to 2005, 15 severe magnetic storms took place, and each of them had a response in the 
operation of the “Signalization, Centralization and Blockage (SCB)” system in the high-latitude parts 
of Russian railways. Also in these cases, the response of the network to the GMS caused false signals 
on the train occupation status of some parts of the railways (Belov et al., 2007; N. G. Ptitsyna, 2008; 
Eroshenko et al., 2010).  
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2.6 Calculation of GICs in power transmission networks 
The calculation of GICs in conductors is usually carried out in two parts (Pirjola, 2002): first, the 
geoelectric field associated with the geomagnetic variation needs to be assessed. This part is purely 
geophysical and is independent of the technological system. Secondly, GICs due to the given 
geoelectric field are determined in the conductor system whose structure and features are known.  
In the following, two possible scenarios will be introduced for the simulation of the geoelectric field: 
a first scenario in which the electric field is constant in magnitude but may vary in orientation and a 
second scenario in which the electric field can vary with time. The latter has been proposed by 
(Pulkkinen et al., 2012). 
For the computation of GICs we follow the procedure proposed by Lehtinen and Pirjola (1985) which 
is explained in the next paragraphs.  
 A power system is a discrete grounded system with N nodes (earthing points). The GICs can be 
computed following the formula: 
                                                              ( ) e1ene JZYUI −+=                                                                        (2.2)     
where U is the unit matrix, and Yn and Ze are the network admittance matrix and earthing 
impedance matrix, respectively. The network admittance matrix Yn is defined by  
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where Rijn refers to the conductor line resistance between nodes i and j. The elements of the Nx1 
column matrix Jn are defined by: 
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The conductor line from node i to node j is denoted sij and E is the geoelectric field. Thus Vij is the 
voltage affecting the line sij. The transmission line current from node i to node j can be solved from 
the equation:  
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3. Network vulnerability framework and risk assessment 
 
Risk and vulnerability analysis are essential tools for proactive risk management. The meaning of the 
concepts and the interrelationship between them vary considerably between different disciplines. It 
is therefore important to define how these concepts are used for network vulnerability analysis. The 
sections below are a synthesis taken from Piccinelli (2013), Zio and Sansavini (2011), Zio et al. (2008), 
Zio and Piccinelli (2010) and Cadini et al. (2009). They provide an introduction to the vulnerability 
and complex network theory framework we applied, as well as the most important centrality 
measures used.  
3.1 Vulnerability framework 
 
The concept of the vulnerability of critical infrastructures is still evolving and a definition has not yet 
been unanimously established. Referring to the growing body of scientific literature on vulnerability, 
it emerges that the term vulnerability has different meanings when used in different contexts and by 
different authors (Bouchon, 2006). Disasters in the past showed that to understand risks a 
perception that is only centered on the concept of hazard is too limited. White (1974) notes that “a 
hazard of low intensity could have severe consequences, while a hazard of high intensity could have 
negligible consequences. The level of vulnerability makes the difference.”  
In the following, we adopt the definition of vulnerability as a susceptibility to disruption or 
destruction (inherent characteristic including resilience capacity) in the design, implementation, 
operation and/or management of an infrastructure system or its elements when exposed to a 
hazard or a threat (Haimes, 2006). This means that vulnerability is a state that exists within a system 
before it encounters a particular hazardous event (hazard independent, inherent vulnerability). This 
may depend on the structure of the system or on its operative states. Other definitions exist that 
view vulnerability as the amount of (potential) damage caused to a system by a particular hazardous 
event (hazard dependent).  
Power networks are infrastructures that exhibit the characteristics of complex systems that require 
them to be analyzed from a holistic point of view which is challenging. The vulnerability analysis of 
these systems must take into account the potentially large number of spatially distributed 
components but also the diverse hazards and threats, including failures that the system can be 
subjected to. This consists of systematically identifying the possible states a system can be put into, 
given a specific strain, and estimating the impact associated with them. The two main outputs of 
vulnerability assessment are then 1) the identification of critical elements and 2) the quantification 
of system vulnerability indicators (Kröger and Zio, 2011).  
There are three different analysis approaches, each covering different important aspects of 
vulnerability: global vulnerability analysis, critical component analysis and geographical vulnerability 
analysis (Johansson et al., 2011). These approaches are described in more detail in the following. 
In a global vulnerability analysis a system is exposed to strains of different type and magnitude, and 
the negative consequences that result are estimated. As the magnitude of the strain increases, the 
performance of the system tends to degrade. Robust systems degrade slowly, whereas vulnerable 
systems might degrade quickly. In network analysis strains are represented by the removal of 
components whereas the magnitude of a strain corresponds to the number or fraction of 
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components removed. Different types of strains can be simulated by selecting different ‘removal 
strategies’ which can be random or targeted (Johansson et al., 2010). 
Critical component analysis identifies the components that are the most critical and estimates the 
consequences of failure of single or sets of components to understand which system elements cause 
the largest negative consequences. In this analysis, all possible combinations of failures are 
evaluated which puts an upper limit to the feasible number of simultaneous failures that can be 
studied and hence it focuses on only relatively small magnitudes of strains. This is in contrast with 
global vulnerability analysis which aims to achieve a representative picture of the system’s 
vulnerability for all magnitudes of strain and as a consequence, only a small sample of the possible 
states are evaluated (Johansson et al., 2010). 
Geographical vulnerability analysis studies if geographic interdependencies exist that allow an 
external event, e.g., a hurricane, tornado, earthquake, explosion, etc., to damage several systems or 
components simultaneously. One type of geographical vulnerability analysis is the identification of 
critical geographical locations. In our approach, this is achieved by characterizing the strains through 
specific ground resistances values (Viljanen, 2012; Patterson and Apostolakis, 2007).  
Each of the vulnerability analysis approaches described above provide only a partial view of the 
vulnerability of a system. If combined, they provide a more complete picture, which allows to obtain 
a more complete picture of a system’s vulnerability (Johansson et al., 2011). In order to identify 
appropriate risk mitigation measures, the identified vulnerabilities must be combined with a hazard 
analysis in a comprehensive risk analysis that also includes determining likelihood estimations.  
However, the present report will only address the vulnerability part of risk. 
Figure 8 shows the approach we used to model the space-weather impact on the power grid. We 
distinguish two models: the structural model, which captures the structural properties of the system 
by means of complex network theory modeling. This is the input to the functional model, which 
accounts for the physical properties and constraints given by the space weather effects on the 
system. Strains can be applied to each model: structural strains, which affect the structural 
properties of the system in terms of removal of components, and functional strains, which affect the 
physical properties of the system, e.g., increased loading or induced currents.  In this report, we 
considered only functional strains.                     
 
 
Figure 8. Approach used for modelling the space-weather impact on the power grid, with a structural and a 
functional part. The structural model represents a network consisting of nodes and edges. The functional 
model is represented by a linear equation (adapted from Johansson et al., 2013). 
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3.2   Complex network theory framework 
Critical infrastructures (CIs), such as power grids, are complex systems of interacting components for 
which the actual structure of the interconnection is relevant (Albert et al, 2000). CIs can be modeled 
as hierarchies of interacting components. In a topological analysis, a CI is represented by a graph 
G(N, K), in which its physical components are mapped into N nodes (or vertices) connected by K 
edges (or arcs), which represent the links of physical connections among them.  
Topological analysis based on classical graph theory can help to identify the relevant properties of 
the structures of a network system (Albert et al., 2000; Strogatz, 2001) by 1) highlighting the role 
played by its components (nodes and connecting arcs) (Crucitti et al., 2006; Zio et al., 2008), 2) 
making preliminary vulnerability assessments based on the simulation of faults (mainly represented 
by the removal of nodes and arcs) and the subsequent re-evaluation of the network topological 
properties (Rosato et al., 2007; Zio et al., 2008).  
In the case of electrical power systems, the existing literature on vulnerability analysis follows a 
topological approach to identifying the critical components in the network (Albert et al., 2004; 
Crucitti et al., 2006; Zio et al., 2008). These analyses can help to identify the elements of structural 
vulnerability, i.e. network edges and nodes whose failure can induce a severe structural damage to 
the network through the physical disconnection of its parts. This kind of analysis is fast from a 
computational point of view and only requires information on the network topology. 
Unfortunately, topological analysis cannot capture all the complex properties observed in a real 
infrastructure system. Consequently, the models need to be extended beyond pure structural 
topology (Boccaletti et al., 2006; Eusgeld et al., 2009). Through the identification of critical 
components, topological can highlight structural vulnerabilities. However, they are limited from the 
point of view of the functional vulnerability of the CI. More specifically, in real network systems the 
vulnerability characterization needs to be supplemented by modeling the dynamics of flow of the 
physical quantities in the network where physical laws and operational rules influence the flow. As a 
consequence, the interplay between structural and dynamic characteristics needs to be evaluated to 
provide information on the elements that are critical for the flow propagation process and on 
prevention and mitigation actions to reduce the risk of undesired effects. However, topological 
analysis is useful as a preliminary screening tool that requires minimal information but it is capable 
of identifying major vulnerabilities and guiding in-depth functional vulnerability analysis. 
In addition to a complex topological structure, many real power networks exhibit significant physical 
inhomogeneities in the capacity and intensity of the connections: for example, there are different 
impedance and reliability characteristics of overhead lines in electrical transmission networks (Hines 
and Blumsack, 2008; Eusgeld et al., 2009). To capture the heterogeneity of real physical systems, 
weights can be assigned to each link of a network that measure the “strength” of the connection. In 
this way, the functional behavior of the CI is approximated in a generalized, but still simple, 
topological analysis framework. Topological, weighted or unweighted, analyses focus on the static 
structural properties of network interconnections and focus on the effects on vulnerability indicators 
caused by the removal of a certain percentage of nodes or links (Latora and Marchiori, 2005; Zio et 
al., 2008) or identifying the elements whose presence is critical with respect to the network 
connectedness (Cadini et al., 2009). Functional models exist that capture the basic realistic features 
of CI networks within a weighted topological analysis framework. This approach disregards the 
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representation of the individual dynamics of the power grid’s elements. These models have helped 
to shed light on how complex networks react to faults and attacks under load flow.  
Finally, complex network theory allows the consideration of dependencies and interdependencies 
among different CIs (Zimmermann, 2001; Duenas-Osorio et al., 2007; Johansson and Jonsson, 2009). 
In order to characterize how a threat could weaken, and possibly disrupt, the safe operation of an 
interconnected system, the relationship established via the connections linking the multiple 
components of the involved infrastructures needs to be modelled (Zio and Sansavini, 2011). 
3.3 Centrality measures 
Vulnerability analysis related to topology allows to address important questions related to the 
connectedness of nodes, shortest path lengths, geographical and regional specifics, etc. and to 
provide a reliable identification of the most critical connections, nodes or areas on which to focus a 
detailed analysis (Zio and Sansavini, 2011). However, caution needs to be exercised when relying on 
topological analysis only as its abstraction level is high. We therefore tried to reduce the gap 
between the very abstract topological analysis and the highly detailed (and computationally 
demanding) simulations of system behavior. 
In order to quantify the structural importance of the network components, several so-called 
“centrality measures” have been introduced. Commonly, centrality measures provide an indication 
of the importance of a network element (arc or node), i.e., of the relevance of its location in the 
network with respect to a given network performance. Depending on the specific definition, a 
centrality measure describes the way in which a node interacts with the rest of the network. As such, 
it provides a measure that helps to rank and prioritise the importance of the nodes for network 
interaction. The term ‘importance’ qualifies the role that the presence and location of the element 
plays with respect to the average global and local connection properties of the whole network. 
Classical topological centrality measures are the degree centrality (Niemen, 1974; Freeman, 1979), 
the closeness centrality (Freeman, 1979; Sabidussi, 1966; Wasserman and Faust, 1994), the 
betweenness centrality (Freeman, 1979) and the information centrality (Latora and Marchiori, 2007). 
They rely only on topological information to determine the importance of a network element. It is 
important to note that critical groups of components can include elements that are not critical when 
considered individually. Therefore, the ranking of importance in the grid has to capture the most 
important component groups. 
The group degree centrality (Everett and Borgatti, 1999), CD(g) of a group g in a network of N nodes, 
can be defined as the number of first neighbours of the group nodes, normalized over the number of 
non-group members: 
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where ki is the degree of node i, in group g and dim(g) is the dimension of the group, i.e. the number 
of member nodes. A node that is connected with multiple group nodes is counted only once. 
The group closeness centrality (Everett and Borgatti, 1999), CC(g) is based on the idea that a node 
can quickly interact with all the other nodes if it is easy accessible  because close to all the others. If 
dij is the topological shortest path length (i.e., the number of connected arcs) between nodes i and j 
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(also called geodesics), the group closeness of a group g is the sum of such distances from the group 
to all vertices outside the group: 
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This measure is normalized by dividing the distance score by the number of non-group members. 
Consequently, larger numbers indicate greater centrality. When the group consists of a single node, 
the group closeness centrality becomes the individual node closeness centrality (Sabidussi, 1966; 
Freeman, 1979; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
The distance from other nodes is one but not the only important property in a network of 
components. Of significance is also which nodes lie on the shortest paths among pairs of other 
nodes, because such nodes have control over the current flow in the network. Freeman (1979) 
defines the betweenness. In this definition, a node is central if it lies on several shortest paths 
among other pairs of nodes. If g is a subset of a graph, sij is the number of geodesics connecting i to j, 
and sij(g) is the number of geodesics connecting i to j passing through g then the group betweenness 
centrality of g, denoted by CB(g) is given by (Everett and Borgatti, 1999): 
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where the sum is taken over all pair of nodes.  
This measure is normalized by dividing it by the theoretical maximum value, which occurs for a 
group of a given size when the result of identifying all the group vertices (i.e., shrinking them to a 
single vertex) is a star with the group in the center. 
The global efficiency of the graph representing the network is defined as (Latora and Marchiori, 
2001): 
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where 1/dij is the efficiency of the connection between nodes i and j in terms of the number of edges 
on the shortest path linking the two nodes. It relates the importance of an edge to the impact on the 
network transmission performance of losing the edges of a group and is hence a measure of 
importance of the group of edges removed (Crucitti et al., 2006). The relative variation of the global 
efficiency due to the removal of a group of edges is calculated as the difference between the global 
efficiency of the network with all the edges of the group removed and the global efficiency of the 
original network, normalized to the latter value.  
The previous measure assume that flow is transmitted along geodesic paths in most networks, 
however, this is not the case (Stephenson and Zelen, 1989; Freeman et al, 1991), because the flow 
from one node of a network to another can take a circuitous route. For example, in network 
infrastructures flow is channeled through selected routes, following the specific operative rules and 
constraints which apply to the system. For the electric power network the flow obeys Kirchhoff’s 
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laws. A realistic betweenness measure should include non-geodesic paths in addition to geodesic 
ones. To address this issue, a more sophisticated measure which includes the contributions from 
non-geodesic paths, has been proposed (Freeman, 1991). 
If the generating sources and load nodes are known, the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm (Ford and 
Fulkerson, 1962) can be used to determine the maximum flow in the network, i.e., the largest 
possible total flow from sources to target nodes in the network, assuming that the flow at a node 
can be split among the edges in each node. The amount of flow through a node i when the 
maximum flow is transmitted from a source (s) to a target (t), averaged over all s and t is expressed 
by the flow betweenness measure (Freeman, 1991): 
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where mjk be the maximum flow from node i to node k and mjk(i) is the maximum flow from node j 
to node k that passes through i. Each edge in the network can be envisaged as a transmission line 
carrying a current flow.  
The flow betweenness is an indicator of the betweenness of nodes in a network in which a maximum 
flow is continuously pumped between all sources and targets. Clearly, the maximum flow needs to 
“know” the ideal route (or one of the ideal routes) from each source to each target. However, 
normally the flow does not follow the ideal path from source to target. This issue was considered in 
the random walk betweenness (Newman, 2005): 
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where Iist is the current flowing through node i on the path from s to t. This measure is appropriate 
to a network in which the flow is transmitted more or less randomly until it finds its target, and it 
includes contributions from many paths that are not ideal. This measure is more physically detailed 
but it requires information on the system network connection pattern, the edges capacities, the 
values of the generating sources and loads, and an algorithm to evaluate the random walk of the 
flow through the network (Newman, 2005). 
When considering the measurement of the connectivity of a node, the definition should consider the 
following three factors (Bompard, 2009): (i) the strength of connection in terms of the weights of the 
edge, (ii) the number of the edges connected with the nodes and (iii) the distribution of weights 
among the edges. The concept of entropy offers itself to define a degree that represents all the 
three factors mentioned above. First, pij, the normalized weight of the edge wij between nodes i and 
j, is considered, for each edge lij connecting nodes i and j: 
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Since 1=∑ j ijp  the entropic degree gi of node i can be defined using entropy as:  
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The degree is a traditional concept in graph theory that is widely applied to the analysis of complex 
networks. Bompard, (2009) notes that the entropic degree may be a good replacement for weighted 
network models used for power grids, gas pipelines, water ducts and transportation. In the case of 
power grids, the entropic degree can provide a direct quantitative measurement of the importance 
of buses. This gives an indication of where additional resources should be directed to increase 
protection.  
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4. Power Grids and Geomagnetically Induced Currents (GICs) 
 
4.1 Case-study: benchmark power grid 
 
Studies on GIC assessment have been proposed in the scientific literature for different power grid 
models: (NERC 2012; Horton et al, 2012; Pirjola, 2009) 
Following the suggestion of Pirjola (2009) we adopt, as benchmark model, the Finnish 400-kV 
transmission power grid, as it was in its configuration from October 1978 to November 1979. The 
network, depicted in Figure 9, consists of 17 stations and 19 transmission lines: the numbers of 
stations and transmission lines are high enough to allow a meaningful analysis but is not too large to 
complicate computation and analysis. Each station is assumed to include a transformer. 
 
 
Figure 9. Schematic map of the Finnish 400 kV power grid in 1978 – 1979. Transmission lines are approximated 
by straight lines, while stations are represented by nodes. Each node is assumed to represent a transformer 
(taken from Viljanen et al., 2012). 
Data of the network have initially been proposed by Lehtinen and Pirjola (1985). The coordinates 
and earthing resistances of the stations and the resistances of the transmission lines are given for 
the sake of completeness s in Tables I and II, respectively. The earthing resistances listed in Table I 
include the effects of the station earthings and the transformers. The earthing resistances of stations 
16 and 17 are set equal to zero to account for the connection to the Swedish 400-kV network. Thus, 
the currents at nodes 16 and 17 include currents that flow between the Finnish and the Swedish 
systems and do not account for earthing GICs (Pirjola, 2009). 
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Station Coordinates [km] Earthing Resistance [Ω]
 East North  
   
1 = Inkoo 351.44 58.17 0.43 
2 = Loviisa 492.79 97.60 0.36 
3 = Nurmijärvi 411.06 106.25 0.66 
4 = Lieto 282.69 120.19 0.60 
5 = Hyyinkää 404.33 125.00 0.47 
6 = Koria 499.52 146.63 0.45 
7 = Olkiluoto 227.40 206.73 0.33 
8 = Ulvila 258.65 230.29 0.64 
9 = Kangasala 361.06 228.85 0.86 
10 = Huutokoski 556.25 305.29 0.57 
11 = Alajärvi 375.00 394.23 0.98 
12 = Alapitkä 543.27 409.13 1.14 
13 = Pikkarala 452.88 593.75 0.70 
14 = Petäjäskoski 441.83 746.15 0.47 
15 = Pirttikoski 520.19 752.40 0.95 
16 = Letsi 244.71 755.77 0 
17 = Messaure 256.73 789.90 0 
Table I. List of the stations (nodes) of the Finnish 400-kV transmission power grid shown in Fig. 9. The east (x) 
and north (y) coordinates and the total earthing resistances of each node are also shown (Lehtinen and Pirjola, 
1985). 
 
Line Number Station A Station B Line Resistance [Ω]
   
1 1 = Inkoo 4 = Lieto 0.59 
2 1 = Inkoo 5 = Hyyinkää 0.65 
3 2 = Loviisa 3 = Nurmijärvi 0.58 
4 2 = Loviisa 6 = Koria 0.33 
5 3 = Nurmijärvi 5 = Hyyinkää 0.076 
6 4 = Lieto 7 = Olkiluoto 0.59 
7 5 = Hyyinkää 9 = Kangasala 1.04 
8 6 = Koria 10 = Huutokoski 1.36 
9 7 = Olkiluoto 8 = Ulvila 0.27 
10 8 = Ulvila 11 = Alajärvi 1.98 
11 9 = Kangasala 11 = Alajärvi 1.47 
12 10 = Huutokoski 11 = Alajärvi 1.88 
13 10 = Huutokoski 12 = Alapitkä 0.98 
14 11 = Alajärvi 13 = Pikkarala 0.96 
15 12 = Alapitkä 14 = Petäjäskoski 3.20 
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16 13 = Pikkarala 15 = Pirttikoski 1.46 
17 13 = Pikkarala 17 = Messaure 2.89 
18 14 = Petäjäskoski 15 = Pirttikoski 0.71 
19 14 = Petäjäskoski 16 = Letsi 1.70 
Table II. Transmission lines between stations A and B and resistances of the Finnish 400-kV power grid shown 
in Fig. 9 (Lehtinen and Pirjola, 1985). 
The first aim of the vulnerability analysis is to understand if and how the structure of the network 
influences the diffusion of GICs in the system. Since the voltage in the transmission lines is obtained 
by integrating the horizontal geoelectric field along the path defined by the conductor line that 
connects two stations, it is noteworthy to look at the line lengths. The Finnish 400-kV transmission 
network shows a broad distribution of line lengths (Figure 10): two lines measure less than 50 km 
while the longest line measures 352 km. The average length is 147 km. 
 
Figure 10.  Line lengths of the network. Lines 5 and 9 are the shortest of the network, Line 15 that connects 
nodes 12 and 14, is the longest.  
Classical topological analysis aims to identify the most connected nodes in the network. The degree 
Centrality, Cd, shows an average value of <Cd> = 0.1397 for the network (Figure 11); this value means 
that the majority of nodes is connected to the other nodes with exactly two links.  The power grid 
comprises few nodes with more than two links; among them, the only node that is most connected 
is node 11, with 4 links. The only two nodes with one link, node 16 and 17, are those connecting the 
Finnish and the Swedish grids. 
The topological Betweenness Centrality (BC), obtained from Eq. (3.3), when g = 1, measures the 
importance of a node in terms of presence of the shortest paths connecting every couple of nodes in 
the network. One can expect that the more a node is connected, the higher will be the probability 
for the node to be passed through by many paths and therefore, also by many shortest paths. Figure 
12 shows that node 11 has the highest betweenness centrality, followed by node 10 and node 5, as 
expected.   
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The Degree and Betweenness Centrality measures provide a first picture of the network and of its 
underpinning structure in terms of nodes and connections. In order to understand the physical 
behavior of the system we also need to consider how it functions when traversed by GICs. 
 
Figure 11. Degree Centrality (Cd) for the power network.  
 
Figure 12. Betweenness Centrality (BC) for the power network. 
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4.1.1 Calculation of GICs: uniform electric field 
 
In order to validate the implementation of the models, a set of baseline GICs calculations were 
performed assuming a uniform electric field E = 1V/km oriented northward and eastward and using 
the formula proposed by Lehtinen and Pirjola (1985) and introduced in Section 2.6:  
                                                            ( ) e1ene JZYUI −+=                                                                           (2.2)                             
Tables III and IV show that the obtained results are in agreement with the numerical calculations 
proposed in Pirjola (2009). GICs flowing to (from) the Earth are defined as positive (negative). The 
following vulnerability analysis is carried out considering an electric field of constant value and 
northward direction. 
Station GIC [A]
 Eastward E=1V/km Northward E=1V/km
  
1 = Inkoo 4.10 -107.53 
2 = Loviisa 58.04 -88.57 
3 = Nurmijärvi -1.11 -35.74 
4 = Lieto -25.43 -36.78 
5 = Hyyinkää 0.69 -16.17 
6 = Koria 27.96 -26.41 
7 = Olkiluoto -102.48 14.89 
8 = Ulvila -20.98 8.19 
9 = Kangasala -26.20 -4.04 
10 = Huutokoski 79.54 -15.38 
11 = Alajärvi -18.63 15.32 
12 = Alapitkä 27.81 1.65 
13 = Pikkarala 52.50 36.11 
14 = Petäjäskoski 36.40 84.85 
15 = Pirttikoski 68.84 63.89 
16 = Letsi -105.89 29.12 
17 = Messaure -55.16 76.62 
Table III Results of the baseline calculations, showing GICs at the stations of the Finnish 400-kV transmission grid.  
 
Line Number Station A Station B GIC [A] 
 
  
Eastward 
E=1V/km 
Northward 
E=1V/km 
1 1 = Inkoo 4 = Lieto -87.68 64.16 
2 1 = Inkoo 5 = Hyyinkää 83.58 43.37 
3 2 = Loviisa 3 = Nurmijärvi -103.62 0.61 
4 2 = Loviisa 6 = Koria 45.58 87.96 
5 3 = Nurmijärvi 5 = Hyyinkää -102.51 36.35 
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6 4 = Lieto 7 = Olkiluoto -62.25 100.94 
7 5 = Hyyinkää 9 = Kangasala -19.63 95.89 
8 6 = Koria 10 = Huutokoski 17.63 114.37 
9 7 = Olkiluoto 8 = Ulvila 40.22 86.05 
10 8 = Ulvila 11 = Alajärvi 61.20 77.86 
11 9 = Kangasala 11 = Alajärvi 6.57 99.93 
12 10 = Huutokoski 11 = Alajärvi -62.58 34.66 
13 10 = Huutokoski 12 = Alapitkä 0.67 95.09 
14 11 = Alajärvi 13 = Pikkarala 23.83 197.14 
15 12 = Alapitkä 14 = Petäjäskoski -27.14 93.44 
16 13 = Pikkarala 15 = Pirttikoski 26.48 84.41 
17 13 = Pikkarala 17 = Messaure -55.16 76.62 
18 14 = Petäjäskoski 15 = Pirttikoski 42.35 -20.52 
19 14 = Petäjäskoski 16 = Letsi -105.89 29.12 
Table IV GICs flowing between stations A and B (as positive from A to B) in the line of the 400-kV Finnish 
transmission grid. 
 
We apply the definition of Entropic Degree (ED) introduced in Chapter 3 to the Finnish transmission 
network to investigate how the degree of connection of the network influences the transit of GIC 
flow through the system. During geomagnetic disturbances, every line of the network acts as a 
source of current for the system: the induced current depends on the length and on the resistance 
of the transmission line but also on the magnitude of the electric field and on the orientation of the 
field with respect to the transmission line. Different lines converging in a node, convey GICs of 
different magnitude. We can consider these GICs as the weight of the contribution of each 
transmission line. Using Eq. (3.8), we consider not only the strength of the connections in terms of 
the weight of the links but also the number of the connections to each node and the distribution of 
the strength of the connections. Figure 13 shows that the highest value of ED is associated with the 
most connected node (node 11), as already seen for the Degree Centrality Cd. The difference 
between Cd and ED is in the different values of ED for nodes with the same degree centrality Cd. For 
example, nodes 3 and 6 show the same Cd but a completely different ED (Figs.  11 and 13). The links 
towards node 6 carry a larger amount of current compared to the links conveying to node 3. 
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Figure 13. Entropic Degree (ED) for the 400-kV Finnish transmission grid computed using Eq. (3.8).  
Upon comparing the Entropic Degree and the Degree Centrality measures, we gain more insight into 
the role played by the nodes in the spreading of GICs: nodes with the same number of links can give 
a different contribution to the diffusion of GICs The ranking of the ED values is listed in the table of 
Figure 14 where the three most connected nodes, in terms of ED, are nodes 11, 13 and 10. 
 
Figure 14. Ranking of the nodes of the 400-kV Finnish power grid with respect to the Entropic Degree (ED) 
Centrality Measure. 
In this study, the current-flow betweenness centrality (CBC) of every node i has been computed as 
the amount of current that flows through i averaged over all the possible paths between source and 
Rank Node 
1 11 
2 13 
3 10 
4 5 
5 6 
6 9 
7 12 
8 7 
9 8 
10 4 
11 1 
12 14 
13 2 
14 17 
15 3 
16 16 
17 15 
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target nodes. The current-flow betweenness centrality values give a ranking of the relevance of the 
nodes in current flow transmission in the network (Fig. 15). 
 
Figure 15. Current-flow betweenness centrality for the stations of the 400-kV Finnish power grid based on the 
topology, and on the electric behaviour of the grid. 
Except for nodes 16 and 17, which are peripheral vertices, the majority of the nodes of the network 
appears to give nearly the same contribution to the diffusion of GICs in the network. Nodes with the 
highest degree (nodes 5, 10 and 13 with degree k5 = k10 = k13=3 and node 11 with k11=4) are also 
nodes with the highest flow betweenness centrality. These elements mainly affect the spreading of 
GICs throughout the network and should be carefully monitored when planning prevention actions 
of GIC diffusion during solar storms. 
We can also rank the nodes with respect to their CBC measure (Figure 16). Nodes 11, 5 and 10 show 
the highest contribution to the diffusion of GICs through the network. 
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Figure 16. Ranking of the nodes of the 400-kV Finnish power grid with respect to Current-flow Betweenness 
Centrality (CBC) measure. 
 
4.1.2 Calculation of GICs: uniform electric field with varying angles 
 
The uniform field scenarios are now assumed to vary their direction. The uniform electric field E = 
1V/km is considered at different orientation angles, starting with the direction from south to north 
(where north is at zero degree), increments of 15 degrees are progressively added up to 165 degree. 
Electric fields of equal magnitude separated by 180 degrees give rise to the same GICs intensity, 
except that the sign is reversed. For each station (Figure 17) and for each line (Figure 18), GICs at 
different angles are represented with different colors, starting from 0 degree (in blue) passing 
through 90 degree (east direction, in green) to 165 degree (in red). The sign of the currents refers to 
the direction of the flow at the stations (Figure 17): GICs entering a node have negative values while 
GICs exiting a node have positive values. 
Rank Node
1 11 
2 5 
3 10 
4 13 
5 6 
6 1 
7 3 
8 2 
9 14 
10 9 
11 8 
12 7 
13 4 
14 12 
15 15 
16 16 
17 17 
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Figure 17. Representation of GICs computed for the stations of the 400 kV Finnish power grid. For each station, 
the different colors represent a different orientation angle of the geoelectric field E. 
Figure 18 shows the magnitude of GICs flowing through the transmission lines. As before, each color 
represents a different angle between the orientations of the electric field.  The sign refers to the 
orientation of the flow: positive values suggest that GICs flow from station A towards station B (as 
listed in Table II), negative values indicate that GICs flow the opposite way, from station B to station 
A. 
 
Figure 18. Representation of GICs computed for each transmission line of the 400 kV Finnish power grid. For 
each line, the different colors represent a different orientation angle of the geoelectric field E. 
The ED and the CBC measures have been investigated for each different angle (Figs. 19 and 20). The 
Entropic Degree centrality measure represents the behavior of each node along with the variation of 
the orientation between the electric field and the orientation of the lines. In Fig. 19, every box 
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represents the entropic degree value of the system computed for a specific angle, starting from the 
first box in which the electric field is directed northward, (0 degree, in blue) and increasing, in each 
box, the orientation angle by 15 degrees until 165 degrees (dark red). 
 
 
Figure 19. The Entropic Degree (ED) centrality measure is represented for each angle, starting from 0° (bar 
graph in the first box from the top) and continuing with an increase of 15° for each successive bar graph. 
36 
 
Figure 19 shows that, despite the variation of the angle between the electric field and the 
transmission lines, the ranking of the nodes given by the ED centrality measure does not change 
drastically: on average, nodes 11 and 13 maintain the highest values of ED, as shown in Table V. 
 
ED Orientation Angle (degree)0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 165
Ra
nk
in
g 
O
rd
er
 
1 11 11 11 11 11 11 5 5 11 11 11 11
2 13 13 13 13 5 5 3 14 14 13 13 13
3 10 10 6 5 13 3 14 11 5 14 10 10
4 5 6 5 10 10 13 11 3 4 10 14 14
5 6 9 10 6 2 2 1 4 13 5 4 5
6 9 8 8 8 8 1 4 1 3 4 5 4
7 12 12 9 2 3 10 2 10 10 3 12 9
8 7 5 12 14 6 8 13 13 1 12 9 12
9 8 7 7 9 14 14 7 2 12 9 7 7
0 4 4 2 3 1 6 8 7 9 7 6 6
11 14 2 14 12 15 4 10 12 7 1 3 8
12 1 1 1 7 9 7 15 16 2 2 2 15
13 15 15 3 1 12 15 16 9 16 6 15 2
14 2 14 15 15 7 16 6 8 15 15 8 1
15 17 17 4 4 16 9 17 17 17 16 1 3
16 3 3 17 16 4 12 9 15 6 17 17 17
17 16 16 16 17 17 17 12 6 8 8 16 16
Table V. Ranking of the nodes of the system according to the importance given by the entropic degree 
centrality measure (ED). 
However, the entropic degree values decrease in magnitude with the increase of the orientation 
angle (Fig. 20).  For example, we can fix the attention on node 11 and follow the trend of the colored 
bar along the field orientation angle direction. Starting from the dark blue bar and following the 
shades of blue along node 11, we can see a decrease in the ED measure until the green bar, where 
ED for node 11 is at its minimum.  Then, continuing with increasing angles, the ED value increases 
again (following shades from yellow to dark red).  
The ranking of the nodes with respect to the ED centrality measure reproduced in Table V shows 
that, in general, the importance (ranking) of the nodes does not change with the variation of the 
orientation angle. However, there is a change when the orientation angle is 90 and 105°, which 
corresponds to the electric field being oriented eastward. In our definition, ED measures the 
connectivity of the network in term of GICs that traverse it. A major contribution to the spreading of 
GICs is given when the electric field is “aligned” with the orientation of the transmission lines. Nodes 
11 and 13 in the 400-kV transmission power grid connect lines whose principal components are 
directed mainly northward. Their contribution is possible when the electric field is oriented 
eastward: in this latter case, lines that have a major eastward component give the highest 
contribution to the spreading of GICs and are connected by nodes 5 and 14, which, in this case, 
become critical with respect to GICs. 
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Figure 20. Three-dimensional representation of the Entropic Degree (ED). The centrality measure is shown for 
all the stations for each angle, starting from 0 degrees (blue bar on the left) and continuing with an increase of 
15° for each successive bar to 165° (last red bar on the right). 
Similarly, the Current-flow Betweenness computed for the different angle orientations considered, is 
represented in Fig. 21, and the ranking of nodes with respect to CBC is listed in Table VI. For CBC, the 
different orientations of the electric field do not affect the ranking for node 11. In this case, those 
nodes which are traversed more by the flow are more important. These are the nodes with the 
highest connection degree: nodes 11, with 4 connections and nodes 5, 13 and 10, with three 
connections each. 
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Figure 21. Bar-Plots of the Current-flow Betweenness Centrality (CBC). Each color represent an angle, starting 
from 0° (top plot, blue), and continuing with 15° increments until 165° (dark red, bottom plot).  
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CBC Orientation Angle (degrees)0 15 0 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 165
Ra
nk
in
g 
or
de
r 
1 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
2 5 5 5 5 13 13 10 10 10 10 10 5
3 10 10 10 13 10 10 13 13 5 5 5 10
4 13 13 13 10 14 14 14 5 13 13 13 13
5 6 1 1 14 5 5 12 14 14 6 6 6
6 1 6 14 1 8 8 15 12 6 14 2 3
7 3 3 8 8 15 15 8 8 8 2 3 2
8 2 2 7 7 7 12 5 6 12 3 14 1
9 14 14 4 15 12 7 6 15 2 8 1 14
10 9 9 3 4 1 1 7 2 3 12 8 8
11 8 4 9 12 4 4 2 3 15 1 12 9
12 4 8 6 9 9 6 3 7 1 7 9 7
13 7 7 2 3 3 9 1 1 7 9 7 4
14 12 15 15 2 6 2 4 9 9 15 4 12
15 15 12 12 6 2 3 9 4 4 4 15 15
16 17 17 17 17 17 17 16 16 17 16 17 17
17 16 16 16 16 16 16 17 17 16 17 16 16
Table VI. Ranking of the nodes of the system according to the importance given by the current-flow 
betweenness centrality measure (CBC). 
 
4.2 Power Flow and GICs 
 
Work is in progress on adding GICs in a power grid system under load flow. A scoping study was 
carried out, the results of which are described in the following section. 
No data on bus loads or generators capacity are publicly available for the model of the 400kV-
transmission power grid proposed as a benchmark case. As a consequence, we inferred the values 
for the requested and supplied power from statistics available at the websites of the Finnish Energy 
Authority (2014), the Finnish transmission power grid operator (Fingrid Oyj, 2014) and the European 
Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSOE, 2014). This data are summarized 
in Tables VII e VIII. 
The percentage of system load was assigned to every single node on the basis of the statistics on the 
power consumption of each area served by the stations listed in the first column of Table VII. 
Following the example proposed in Grigg (1999), the reactive part of the loads (forth column) was 
interpolated from the reliability test system RTS96. 
 
Station Bus load Load 
  % of System Load [MW] [MVAr]* 
1 = Inkoo 10.8 458 93 
2 = Loviisa 5.4 229 47 
3 = Nurmijärvi 9.5 403 82 
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4 = Lieto 5.6 237 49 
5 = Hyyinkää 4.5 191 39 
6 = Koria 3.7 157 32 
8 = Ulvila 8.2 348 71 
9 = Kangasala 6.1 259 53 
10 = Huutokoski 4.2 178 36 
11 = Alajärvi 6.3 267 55 
12 = Alapitkä 3.5 148 30 
13 = Pikkarala 5.7 242 49 
14 = Petäjäskoski 11 466 95 
15 = Pirttikoski 11.1 471 96 
16 = Letsi 2.1 89 18 
17 = Messaure 2.3 97 20 
Total 100 4240 865 
Table VII. Table of real power and reactive power demand for the system loads (* MVAr is the unit for reactive 
power).  
Data on generating units (Table VIII) show that more than half of the supplied power is produced by 
the nuclear power plants located at Loviisa and Olkiluoto. This latter is also assumed as the slack 
node of the transmission grid. 
 
Station Unit Size Unit type 
  [MW]   
1 = Inkoo 690 Coal 
2 = Loviisa 1032 Nuclear/Fossil fuel 
4 = Lieto 330 Coal 
6 = Koria 160.5 Fossil fuel/Biomass 
7 = Olkiluoto 1860.5 Nuclear/Fossil 
8 = Ulvila 285 Biomass/Coal 
9 = Kangasala 333 Fossil fuel/Coal 
10 = Huutokoski 180 Fossil fuel/Biomass 
13 = Pikkarala 195 Fossil fuel/Biomass 
Total 5066   
Table VIII. Table of the generating unit type and capacity for the system. 
 
Once GICs have been calculated for every node, their effect needs to be inserted into the 
transmission power grid model. As introduced in Section 2.4, GICs can induce saturation in 
transformers and, as a main consequence, cause reactive power losses (Kappenman, 2010; Overbye 
et al., 2012). If the system cannot supply the increase in reactive power demand, it can eventually 
collapses. 
Following the observations of Albertson et al. (1973) and Walling and Kahn (1991), we adopt the 
assumption that each transformer’s reactive power losses Qloss vary linearly with GICs and with the 
voltage of the bus: 
                                                                         Qloss = VkVkIgic                                                                            (4.1) 
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In Equation (4.1) VkV is the station voltage, expressed in kV, Igic is the current induced in the 
transformer, expressed in Ampère, and k is a transformer specific constant. In principle, the value k 
for each transformer should be known. In this study, we consider the constant k to have, for all the 
transformers, a value equal to 2.8, as suggested in the literature (Albertson et al., 1981). 
GICs computed for different scenarios have been included in the AC power flow for the 400kv 
Finnish transmission power grid, as shown in Fig. 22.   
 
Figure 22. Outline of the method employed to evaluate the load flow in the 400kV transmission grid in the 
presence of GICs.  
For our scoping study we considered four scenarios. In each of them we increased the magnitude of 
the electric field, which assumes the peak values computed by Pulkkinnen (2012): |E|=1V, 2V, 5V 
and 20V.  For each of these electric field magnitudes and for each orientation angle, the resulting AC 
power flow has been calculated using MATPOWER (2011). The collapse of the system was signaled 
by the non-convergence of the power flow calculation. Results are summarized in Table IX. 
 
 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 165
|E|=1V       
|E|=2V       
|E|=5V       
|E|=20V       
Table IX. Schematic representation of the convergence of the power flow algorithm for the 400-kV power 
transmission power grid. Convergence is represented by green boxes; red boxes represent collapse of the 
system. 
The first results of this study seem to indicate that the system can resist GICs induced from high 
intensity electric fields. Moreover, the network seems more prone to collapse when the electric field 
has a northward direction, as shown by the red boxes in Table IX. 
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4.3 Discussion 
 
In this study, complex network theory has been used to investigate the vulnerability of the power 
network to space weather impact. The ranking of nodes with respect to ED and CBC centrality 
measures identifies the most important nodes of the network with respect to GICs: nodes with the 
highest number of links contribute the most in the diffusion of GICs through the network. Since we 
want to avoid GICs to flow throughout the system, these are the critical nodes to monitor when 
considering mitigation measures, in order to avoid effects leading to possible blackouts. 
The analysis of the behavior of the system affected by an electric field with different orientation 
shows little variation of the importance of nodes with varying angles. However, there are changes in 
the ranking of the nodes, as shown in Tables VII and VIII. The electric field integrated along the 
transmission lines acts as a voltage generator (Eq. (2.7)) for the network and, since the geoelectric 
field is rotational, the integral depends on the path between nodes. In particular, since the 
geovoltage is the result of an inner product, it depends on the electric field and on the projection of 
the length of the transmission line alongside the direction of the electric field.  We kept the 
geoelectric field magnitude uniform so the varying contribution to the geovoltage is given by the 
projection of the “global length” of the network.  If one focuses on the two principal directions, 
north and east, one realizes that the network expands more in the northward than the eastward 
direction, thus a strong geoelectric field directed northward will have a more pronounced impact on 
the network. 
Table IX confirms this finding. It represents the risk for the power grid in AC load-flow regime to 
collapse due to extreme space weather. Non-convergence for the system occurs when the 
magnitude of the geoelectric field is high and directed northward. In our study, the dependence of 
the orientations of power lines with respect to the geoelectric field results more pronounced than in 
the study of in Pirjola (2002). 
Further work is underway to analyze the vulnerability of power grids to space weather impact in 
more detail, including the refinement of assumptions and models to arrive at a unified assessment 
of the associated risk at EU level.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
During geomagnetic storms, high voltage transmission grids are particularly exposed to damage: 
induced geomagnetic currents (GICs) can damage transformer equipment and cause voltage 
instability, possibly causing power systems to collapse.  
Power systems are large-networked engineered systems, whose complexity and vulnerability to 
hazards and failures can be investigated by means of complex network theory. By representing 
stations with nodes and transmission lines with links between nodes, complex systems can be 
described by models that are abstract enough for handling the computational burden and that are 
nevertheless representative of the physical behavior of the system.  
In the proposed study, we investigated the vulnerability of power grids to space weather. The 
assessment was performed by means of vulnerability indicators applied to a benchmark case study. 
The aim of the study was to understand how the structural and physical characteristics of the 
network influence and drive the spreading of GICs during a geomagnetic storm, and to identify 
which components in the network are more involved. This is the basis for understanding the 
behavior of the system under a “geomagnetic” stress and eventually, identifying where and how to 
best implement mitigation strategies. 
Work is in progress to further validate and expand our approach with the aim to eventually carry out 
a risk assessment of the power grid at EU level. This requires an assessment of the likelihood for a 
system to experience a strong geomagnetic storm and of the potential consequences.  A part of this 
study has already been implemented into the Joint Research Centre’s Global Resilience and Risk 
Assessment Platform (GRRASP) which we will at a later stage use to model ripple effects due to 
space weather induced power grid failure via interdependencies with other critical infrastructures. 
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